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Norway and the BRICS (I): 
An Overview of Emerging Power Cooperation 
Benjamin de Carvalho and Halvard Leira
The BRICS have become an important grouping in interna-
tional politics. In assessing the importance of the BRICS for 
Norway and the challenges they represent, we need to delve 
into who the BRICS are and what they represent.
On one level, assessing who the BRICS are is a given, as 
the acronym is built on the club membership. Starting on 
the basis of the RIC cooperation between Russia, India and 
China, Brazil joined the group for high-level talks from 2006 
which culminated in the first BRIC summit in Yekaterinburg 
in 2009 – finally giving a formal reference point to the Gold-
man Sachs acronym which had been of common use since 
2003. South Africa joined the club in 2010, turning the plu-
ral “s” of BRICs into a capital one. Yet, the fact that five of 
the most important rising or emerging powers are formally 
part of an association, does not preclude them from coopera-
tion on other fronts. For instance, the RIC cooperation has 
continued to take place on the sidelines of BRICS, the 13th 
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, 
the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China hav-
ing just wrapped up in Beijing on 2 February 2015.
To be sure, it is not surprising that cooperation among rising 
powers would take place on a number of different arenas. 
Indeed, beyond the “emerging power” label and foreign 
policy ambitions, the countries have few common charac-
teristics. Searching for commonalities between the emerg-
ing powers, one is tempted to conclude that above average 
economic growth is the only factor they all have in common. 
Russia, seated in the seat of the Soviet Union in the UN Secu-
rity Council, and China, the potential rising superpower, 
are regarded by many a commentator as belonging to the 
category of great powers rather than emerging ones. China’s 
GDP is larger that the size of the four others combined, while 
in terms of population India and China are about seven times 
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Summary
In assessing the current status and importance of 
the BRICS states, the fact that none of them were 
ever fully members of the post-1945 order may very 
well be the most important characteristic. The BRICS 
are all emerging powers, which to some extent influ-
ences their general foreign policy outlook. But, as we 
argue here, the future of the grouping must also be 
understood in light of Russia’s weakened economic 
and political position today. While Brazil, India and 
South Africa have traditionally been staunch defend-
ers of non-intervention, their foreign policies of the 
last decades have been based on being able combine 
this position with close ties to Western powers. 
It is far from unthinkable that Russia’s current posi-
tion will push those three countries to collaborate 
more closely within the confines of IBSA, the group-
ing comprising the BRICS without the less democratic 
Russia and China. Such collaboration might involve 
less defiance towards the West, as the grouping is 
perceived as having a “shared identity” with more 
“normative power”. 
We conclude that a policy towards emerging pow-
ers cannot be anchored solely around the BRICS, but 
must take into account other groupings and states as 
well how changing circumstances can dramatically al-
ter the significance of these groupings.
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larger than the three remaining ones. Equally so, China’s 
defense spending equals roughly that of the four others 
combined. Brazil, India and South Africa on the other hand 
are well-developed democracies, while Russia and China fig-
ure much lower on these indicators. In terms of trade, most 
BRICS have strong economic ties with China, save for Rus-
sian and Indian exports, where the Netherlands and USA fig-
ure as their main export partner respectively. Germany, Saudi 
Arabia, South Korea, Australia, UAE, Switzerland, Italy also 
figure as important trade partners for many of the BRICS. 
The BRICS at a glance
Sources: IMF, MNI Indicators, SIPRI Yearbook, IISS, Michigan State University/Global Edge
Based on such an overview, it is easy to make the case that to 
look at the BRICS as one group in terms of Norwegian foreign 
policy towards them makes little sense, as they all have quite 
different foreign policy engagements, different economic 
profiles and different systems of governance. The argument 
could therefore easily be made that the BRICS are little more 
than a label. Yet, such a conclusion would be a hasty one. 
The BRICS are all what is commonly referred to as emerging 
or rising powers, which to some extent influences their gen-
eral foreign policy outlook. Furthermore, as Andrew Cooper 
has pointed out, “labels matter” (2010: 63).
After a brief overview of the different BRICS countries, we 
offer some reflection on different emerging power groupings 
or “labels” before ending with some remarks on the nature 
and role of emerging powers today. 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
The BRICS share certain similarities. As discussed above, 
these are less a matter of economic, military or political 
aspects, but more a question of stated ambitions and their 
view on the power structure of international society. Being 
all states who are “on the outside looking in” as Andrew Hur-
rell (2006) has argued with reference to the fact that none of 
the BRICS were ever fully integrated in the post-1945 world 
order. They share a strong anti-hegemonic commitment, and 
show little willingness to abandon or set aside the principle 
of territorial state sovereignty. 
For instance, Brazil’s foreign policy establishment has 
sought to make the country indispensable in major interna-
tional negotiations and to gain credibility as a useful media-
tor between north and south, industrialized and developing 
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countries. Brazil dismisses ambitions to acquire substantial 
military capacity, and has become a significant player in 
issues ranging from trade to development cooperation, from 
climate change to international peace and security. 
Russia’s association with the rising power club is more prob-
lematic. The country has defied Western forms of influence 
more strongly than any of the other BRICS, and sees itself as 
a traditional great power rather than an emerging one. This 
impacts the range of foreign policy alternatives with Rus-
sia, and certainly its position as a defiant outsider – “look-
ing in”, perhaps, but wanting to stay on the outside. The 
recent annexation of Crimea and the ongoing engagement in 
Ukraine also makes it difficult to assess Russia’s long-term 
goals in terms of its current policies. One could argue that to 
Russia, association with the BRICS club is more a question of 
generating momentum for checking Western influence.
India’s profile as an emerging power is more clear-cut. With 
a strong economy, important defense spending and major 
influence in its region, Indian elites argue that working 
together with other countries labeled as “emerging” will add 
further momentum to India’s growth, influence and prestige. 
Treating China as part of a group of rising powers is not 
straightforward. For, while there is no doubt that China is 
rising, such a rise is rather as contestant to a great power “+” 
status. As such, to the extent that China is a rising power, it is 
so along purely economic lines, and first and foremost, one 
could argue, by name or by association, as the C in BRICS. 
However, it is also possible to address China from the per-
spective of “outside looking in”. For, while China’s capabili-
ties are undisputed, China has not yet fully taken part in the 
institutions of international society, as it has remained on 
the outside. Being the smallest of the rising powers in eco-
nomic and military terms, South Africa’s membership to the 
BRICS club is less a matter of economic or capability indica-
tors than the leadership role it assumes in Africa. 
The BRICS and Other Groupings
No doubt, the BRICS are important in current affairs, and will 
likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Yet, the BRICS do 
not tell the whole story when it comes to the role played by 
emerging powers today. In fact, depending on indicators and 
issues, any policy towards emerging powers must be mindful 
of other states than the BRICS as well as other groupings. 
Between 2001 and 2005, the BRIC countries were a group 
largely by virtue of being emerging markets rather than 
emerging powers. This meaning changed when the BRIC 
countries institutionalized their relations at the first BRIC 
Summit in Yekaterinburg in 2009. The background to this 
summit may help understand aspects of the BRIC countries’ 
policies and outlook. The initiative behind the summit was 
largely a Russian one, as the BRIC countries met at the initia-
tive of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov. Tying the group of 
emerging powers more closely together also fit well in Putin’s 
need for strengthening Russia’s position vis-à-vis the West. 
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As Oliver Stuenkel has argued, given the central role or Rus-
sia in establishing the BRIC partnership in the first place, 
studying Russia’s ambitions for the BRICS collaboration may 
offer cues as to the future of the BRICS partnership (2013). 
In advance of the fifth BRICS Summit, Russia released its 
Concept of participation of the Russian Federation in BRICS. 
The document boasts that “the creation of BRICS initiated 
in 2006 by the Russian Federation has been one of the most 
significant geopolitical events at the start of the new century. 
In a short while, the association managed to become an 
important factor of world politics.” It further states states 
that the BRICS “can potentially become a key element of a 
new system of global governance, first of all, in the financial 
and economic areas. At the same time, the Russian Federa-
tion stands in favor of positioning BRICS in the world system 
as a new model of global relations, overarching the old divid-
ing lines between East and West, and North and South.” Of 
importance too is Russia’s mention of “creating a permanent 
secretariat” for the BRICS, an issue which could potentially 
contribute to further institutionalize the grouping. 
Yet, in spite of the traction the BRICS may have today, the 
future of the grouping must also be understood in light of 
the Russia’s weakened economic and political position 
today. Brazil, India and South Africa, while being staunch 
defenders of non-intervention, nevertheless have based their 
foreign policies of the last decades on being able combine 
this position with close ties to Western powers. It is far from 
unthinkable that Russia’s current position will push those 
three countries to collaborate more closely within the con-
fines of IBSA, the grouping comprising the BRICS without the 
less democratic Russia and China. Such collaboration might 
involve less defiance towards the West, as the grouping is 
perceived as having a “shared identity” with more “norma-
tive power”, as Andrew Cooper shows (2010:65). A policy 
towards emerging powers cannot be anchored solely around 
the BRICS, but must take into account other groupings and 
states as well as changing circumstances – both interna-
tional and domestic – can dramatically alter the significance 
of these groupings. 
A policy towards emerging powers must, for instance, 
also take into account the BRICSAM cooperation (or Heili-
gendamm 5, as they are often called with reference to the 
formalization of the process at the 2007 G-8 Summit in Heili-
gendamm) which also includes Mexico. Other groupings, 
more or less formalized, of which one needs to be mindful 
include “The Big Ten” list of countries “that will change our 
lives” proposed by Jeffrey Garten in 1997, which included 
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, 
Poland, South Africa, and Turkey. Another group of impor-
tant countries is – again – Goldman Sachs’ Next Eleven 
(or N-11), which consisted of states which were not on par 
with BRIC but where within reach of that level: Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philip-
pines, Turkey, South Korea, and Vietnam. Finally, one could 
even make the case that a policy towards emerging powers 
ought to be mindful of states which do not figure on any of 
these groupings or categories, such as Japan.
Many of Norway’s global initiatives are launched in partner-
ship with these states, and many of them see themselves as 
“emerging” on the same level as the BRICS. A policy towards 
the BRICS should therefore not be at the expense of other 
groupings. On the other hand, if the BRICS continue their 
process of further institutionalization of the collaboration, 
they may force other states’ hands in terms of relating to them 
as a group, or even as the representative group of emerging 
powers. In that sense labels do matter, and may prove to mat-
ter even more in the future. 
On the other hand, the RIC cooperation comprising Russia, 
India and China has continues alongside the BRICS sum-
mits, and a possible backlash against Russia may make the 
RIC cooperatio n more compatible with Russian interests. At 
the recent Summit of the RIC foreign ministers, it was jointly 
underlined that in light of the “significant and rapid changes 
underway in the world” it was important that “the interna-
tional community should remain committed to democrati-
zation of international relations and multi-polarity.” They 
further stressed “the need to respect diversity of civilizations 
and the independent choice of development path and social 
system by the people of all countries, support peaceful set-
tlement of disputes through political and diplomatic means.” 
And “opposed forced regime change in any country from 
the outside, or imposition of unilateral sanctions based on 
domestic laws” (RIC Summit 2015).
Emerging Powers in International Politics
While we are referring to emerging or rising powers when 
using the BRICS shorthand, it is important to note that the 
label is no definition of the term, and that by extension what 
the BRICS may have in common may not be the defining traits 
of emerging powers, which a foreign policy aimed at these 
countries needs to take into account. Yet, while emerging 
powers have become part of the taken-for-granted vocabu-
lary of international affairs since the turn of the century there 
is little consensus as to what the term refers to. 
While Realists may favor understandings which stratifies 
actors based on capabilities (see for instance Mearsheimer 
2001), more institutionalist takes may favor understandings 
of powerhood and great power responsibility based on the 
norms and expectations of international society (the prime 
example here being Bull 1977). Yet, both understandings 
tend to downplay “transitional powers”, that is, state between 
different status categories. How best to understand emerging 
powers, then, and what they represent? It is our contention 
here that emerging powers are clearly too important at the 
global level today to relegate them to the regional level, so, 
what distinguishes them from mere regional powers is that 
they are (following Buzan and Wæver 2004) often responded 
4NUPI
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
C.J. Hambros plass 2D
PO Box 8159 Dep. NO-0033 Oslo, Norway
www.nupi.no |  info@nupi.no 
Established in 1959, the Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs [NUPI] is a leading 
independent research institute on international 
politics and areas of relevance to Norwegian 
foreign policy. Formally under the Ministry of 
Education and Research, NUPI nevertheless 
operates as an independent, non-political 
instance in all its professional activities. 
Research undertaken at NUPI ranges from short-
term applied research to more long-term basic 
research.
   
Policy Brief
Funding
Funding for this policy brief was provided for 
by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
through the project “Norway and the BRICS: 
Mapping Opportunities and Challenges”.
8 · 2015
About the Authors
Benjamin de Carvalho is Senior Research Fellow 
at NUPI and part of the Research Group on 
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.
Halvard Leira is Senior Research Fellow at 
NUPI and leader of the Research Group on 
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. He has published 
extensively on Norwegian foreign policy and 
diplomacy.
to by others on the basis of system level calculations about the 
present and near-future distribution of power. Consequently, 
emerging powers are emerging from their regions and onto 
the global scene, and possess attributes or potential to bid 
for great power status in the short or medium term. There is 
of course a great empirical variety of emerging powers, as 
Hart and Jones (2011) have recently pointed out, with some 
being closer to achieving great power status than others. 
In spite of this, Andrew Hurrell, argued that in addition to 
economic growth, emerging powers possessed a number of 
common traits: they have high degree of (potential) military 
and political resources, internal cohesion, and “some abil-
ity to contribute to the generation of a revised international 
order.” They also have aspirations for a more influential role 
at the international level, and the relations among them have 
become stronger and more institutionalized. Finally, and 
this may be the most important criterion which traditional 
categorizations of powers omit, is the fact that “the rising 
powers were never fully integrated into the post-1945 order. 
Being on the outside looking in has heavily conditioned their 
strategic interests and conceptions of national purpose.” In 
assessing the current status and importance of the BRICS, 
this may very well be the most important characteristic. For a 
country like Norway, which is a staunch defender of the post 
1945-order (Leira 2012), understanding the ambiguity with 
which the BRICS view this order, will be crucial for the ability 
to craft adequate and sensible policies; attuned both to Nor-
wegian values and interests and the positions of the BRICS.
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